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This article examines new multilateral food and agriculture development programs implemented 
in response to the 2008 Global Food Crisis.  These programs, which seek to increase agricultural 
investment and production in developing countries, have gained wide currency among donors, 
recipient governments and multilateral organizations.  Given the significant financial and 
political resources committed to their success, these new multilateral food and agriculture 
programs point to a new global food security policy consensus.  By examining two of the key 
World Bank and EU programs prioritizing the integration small-scale and peasant farmers into 
commodity chains, we argue they fail to adequately address the obstacles poor farmers 
themselves have identified as critical to improving their food security and livelihoods.   
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The 2007-2008 Global Food Crisis (GFC) rekindled interest and concern about agriculture and 
food security issues among a wide sector of scholars, policy-makers, practitioners and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). The crisis was a watershed moment illustrating the fragility 
of the global food system and demonstrating how even a relatively brief episode of market 
volatility could swiftly unravel decades of development gains. Much has been written about the 
GFC and its aftermath in recent years, in particular with regards to the end of cheap food, 
persistent high levels of world food insecurity, reform of global food security governance, the 
financialization of food, land grabbing, and the deepening linkages between climate change and 
food insecurity.  
 
Like many scholars and observers, we do not see the GFC as a singular event in time but instead 
as one manifestation of a prolonged global food insecurity and agrarian crises. In the global agri-
food system, food prices are a particularly potent signal of systematic crises. In particular, 
volatile and fluctuating food prices, however measured, make the wider food insecurity/agrarian 
crises visible and legible to the state and other actors. That being said, it has now been nearly six 
years since the GFC became part and parcel of global development debates. This calls for a sober 
assessment of the developments that have taken place during this period. This paper is a first cut 
at an assessment and we revisit multilateral food and agriculture investment programs that were 
implemented as so-called responses to the GFC.  
 
These programs deserve particular attention. First, such programs became the “flagship” 
response by donor states to the crisis; these are the most visible global development response. 
Second, donor states appear to have largely fulfilled their commitments of material support for 
these programs. It is not simply that donors paid up; such “kept promises” are striking given that 
most other commitments donors made, especially with regard to regulation and governance to 
address the GFC, have not materialized (indeed, most have been forgotten already). Third, such 
programs represent a massive financial contribution by donors. This appears a departure from the 
often noted historical decline of official development assistance (ODA) to agricultural and food 
security, although it is not clear if donors will continue to support these multilateral food and 
agriculture development programs over the long-term. Fourth, these programs have gained wide 
currency among development practitioners, scholars, and, most importantly, donor and recipient 
governments as a new model for agricultural development. This in fact may have profound 
importance given the “stickiness” of paradigms in global development policy. To the extent that 
these programs have forged, and articulate, an ideational and political consensus among donors 
and recipients, this consensus is likely to have long-term influence on food and agriculture policy 
going forward at the national, bilateral and multilateral level. In other words, it would not be 
unsurprising if global development policies on agriculture and food security increasingly are to 
be made in the image of such programs. 
 
In this paper we examine two of these flagship multilateral food and agriculture development 
programs: the European Union’s Food Facility and the G8-sponsored Global Agriculture Food 
Security Program. We argue that these programs have been instrumental in institutionalizing an 
emergent global development paradigm that seeks to transform small-scale and peasant farmers 
into agricultural entrepreneurs. We further suggest that these programs do not adequately address 
  
the obstacles poor farmers themselves have identified as critical to improving their food security 
and livelihoods. This paints a picture of a post-GFC development agenda driven by the logic of 
agriculture modernization and marketization but that fails to address many of the underlying 
structural constraints peasants face in order to improve their livelihoods and food security.   
 
From the Global Food Crisis to a Crisis of Production 
 
Support for multilateral food and agriculture investment programs would have not have been 
possible without constructing the idea that the GFC was a crisis of production. For many 
observers, the 2008 global food crisis represented the nadir of the agro-industrial model and 
provided a rare opportunity for reforming the world food system.  There is a massive literature 
about the causes and consequences of the GFC that we will not repeat here. They key point is 
that despite a high degree of debate about the underlying causes and drivers, nearly all analysts 
regardless of ideological and disciplinary persuasion, understood the crisis as the interplay of 
multiple, complex and multidimensional factors.i Indeed, the complexity underlying the GFC 
was deeply integrated into the official discourse and the proposals put forward by governments, 
international organizations and global civil society to address the crisis. Consider biofuels which 
form a new food-feed-fuel complex that exacerbates the global hunger challenge (Banerjee, 
2011). For example, a proposal by Japan to establish a global food reserve to tackle market 
speculation and price volatility, the G8’s strong statement against export bans, a UN-based 
initiative to gain political support for an international agreement, and a civil society declaration 
urging for the right to food to serve as a basis for the national and international response to the 
GFC capture the complexity. Another confirmation of the acceptance of complexity and 
multidimensionality is the fact that even to debate the policy response to the crisis, institutions at 
all levels have established multi-perspective units to devise food security solutions.ii 
 
The early acceptance of the complexity and multidimensionality of the GFC, which suggested 
that equally complex and multidimensional solutions would be required, appears to have given 
way to a singular development policy narrative: a crisis of production. Indeed it is remarkable 
how rapidly this ideational shift has taken place and the extent to which it now dominates the 
policy debate about global food security (McMichael and Schneider, 2011). Whereas in the early 
days of the crisis policy debates about financial speculation or global food reserves appeared to 
have attracted significant interest and support among a wide constellation of governments, 
international organizations, and global civil society, much of these efforts have slowly fallen of 
the regulatory/governance agenda. Our point is not that these issues have been dropped because 
of exhaustive debate. Indeed, many of these policy issues have disappeared from the agenda 
often without significant and substantive discussions at the international level (Wise & Murphy, 
2013). In sharp contrast, the post-crisis official policy appears to have developed a singular focus 
on boosting agriculture production as the most appropriate (and only) way to address the 
challenge of feeding a growing world population (hence the so-called  “9 billion people in 2050” 
problem that now dominates public discourse). Declining agricultural productivity in basic food 
crops in developing countries has long been a concern in development policy circles, however, in 
recent years, projects such as the Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme 
(CAADP), the Alliance Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) and more recently the New Alliance 
for Food Security and Nutrition have exemplified the renewed focus on raising farm productivity 
in developing countries. As a result, the dominant post-crisis response has been to muster 
  
resources for increasing agricultural production as its primary objective.  This is evidenced in the 
massive inflow of financial resources towards the provision of agricultural inputs, technology, 
and related infrastructure, for which international assistance amounted to 13.5 billion $US in 
2008-2009 alone (G8, 2009). 
 
Smallholders: Not Just Any Old Productivity Boosts Will Do 
 
The crisis of production, (mainstream) global development thinkers tell us, is not occurring at all 
scales. The so-called crisis of production, its proponents argue, is in fact most acute among 
small-scale farmers in developing and least-developing countries. While we accept this may be 
factually correct,iii it is equally important to contextualize how the crisis of production facilitates 
a reframing of the official discourse about the role of small-scale agricultural producers in world 
agriculture.  
 
Part of this new official discourse does seek to valorize small-scale farmers. “Small-scale” 
farmers are still the vast majority of the world’s farmers. There are about 500 million small farms 
in developing countries (IFAD, 2009) supporting an estimated over two billion people (Hazel et 
al, 2007: Birner & Resnick, 2005).  Although the term “small-scale” or smallholder farmers is 
not a technical definition, general characteristics include: farm sizes of two hectares or less; the 
prevalence of female-headed households; limited access to credit, inputs, information, and 
extension services; net-food buyers; and, house-hold income is less than two US$ a day. The 
precariousness of small-scale farming is significant and well-known; smallholder farmers 
account for at least half of the world’s hungry (FAO, 2009a).  As such, small-scale farmers 
represent a significant global constituency critical to world food security, employment, 
sustainable development, and poverty-reduction efforts.  
 
In the series of policy debates, reports and plans designed to resolve the GFC, the extremely 
diverse and heterogonous group of small-scale framers has been transformed into the 
homogenizing category of ‘smallholder farmers’.  An early articulation of the set of development 
policy interventions to be targeted at smallholder farmers appeared in the World Bank’s 2008 
World Development Report (WDR).  Although released in late 2007 and prior to the peak of the 
GFC, the WDR has been highly influential in shaping the post-GFC response (McMichael, 
2009).  The report posited a very different characterization of smallholder farmers compared, for 
example, to the pro-agroecology vision of the International Assessment of Agricultural 
Knowledge, Science, and Technology for Development (IAASTD). The WDR emphasized the 
need to increase the economic competitiveness of smallholder farms. According to the World 
Bank, institutional reforms such as secure land tenure, the development of markets to manage 
risk and inputs, and the wide-scale incorporation of modern agricultural biotechnology will 
enable smallholder farmers to be successful market actors (World Bank, 2008). Targeting global 
development policy towards smallholder farmers is embedded in a persuasive logic; supply-
driven interventions directed at increasing the participation of smallholders in markets will yield 
maximum food security benefits, given that much of this population already live in extreme 
poverty (Vanhaute, 2011).   
 
Echoes of the Bank’s recommendations are found in the Comprehensive Framework for Action 
(CFA) produced by the UN’s High Level Task Force on the Global Food Security Crisis. This 
  
latter document reflected the consensus view of the UN system and Bretton Woods institutions 
on agriculture policy, although it also incorporated some elements of the IAASTD (Clapp, 2008).  
The CFA outlined major policy interventions for smallholder farmers to boost and sustain 
increased production and enabling market-led development (UN, 2008).  Similar to the WDR, a 
baseline assumption of the CFA is that the lack of basic resources, market-based incentives and 
well functioning institutions are the fundamental constraints preventing smallholder farmers 
from fulfilling their potential as economic agents (UN, 2008: 19).   
 
This approach to smallholders has become the new policy status quo and has been mainstreamed 
into the global discourse on agriculture.  Prime examples of this are the G8 L’Aquila Joint 
Statement on Global Food Security (G8, 2009), the G8/G20 Pittsburgh Summit Leaders’ 
Statement (http://www.pittsburghsummit.gov/mediacenter/129639.htm, accessed 28 November 
2009), and the Declaration of the World Summit on Food Security (FAO, 2009b). There is 
tectonic shift in global development policy with small-scale farmers emerging as a problem 
requiring fixing. Small-scale farmers, it appears, are not sufficiently integrated into the global 
food system. The task global development officials have set for themselves is reinvesting in 
agriculture in order to make the global food system better serve smallholders and for 
smallholders to better serve the global food system. 
 
By no means do we argue that in principle, investment in agriculture and market development 
focused on smallholder farms are misguided policies.  In fact, we like many others are 
encouraged by the renewed commitment to investment in agriculture.  If such investments are 
targeted at the most marginal farmers and involve them in the very design and implementation of 
programs, if they are accompanied with sufficient safety-nets, social and physical infrastructure, 
and meaningful regulation of the agriculture sectors and labour markets to ensure producers and 
workers receive prices that allow them to live in dignity, the new emphasis on agriculture 
investment could have profound positive impacts on food security in particular and on poverty 
more generally.  However, we remain cautious and recognize that there are many obstacles 
facing the design and implementation of such a broad policy package.  We now turn our attention 
to certain elements of the post-GFC agenda that display considerable momentum but have not 
yet been examined.  
 
New Multilateral Agriculture Investment Programs 
 
Several major multilateral and regional agriculture investment programs were launched in 
response to the GFC. Two multilateral programs promoting investment in agriculture are 
analyzed here: the European Union Food Facility (EUFF) and the World Bank’s The Global 
Agricultural and Food Security Program (GAFSP).  In our view, these financing mechanisms 
have benefited from significant institutional and political support (as well as considerable 
financial commitments), and have significantly shaped post-GFC global and national policy and 
programming.  
 
European Union Food Facility (EUFF) 
 
The EU was one the earliest donors to put into place a new funding mechanism to address the 
GFC.  By late 2008 the EU had legislated a Food Facility (EUFF) providing one billion Euros 
  
(1.45 billion US$) of development funding over a three year period.  
 
The facility sought to bridge the gap between emergency aid and medium to long-term 
development aid to agriculture. Its main objective was to support smallholder farming by 
expanding access to agricultural inputs and services such as fertilizers and seeds, microcredit, 
investment, equipment, infrastructure and storage. It also included safety-net measures to help 
meet basic food needs. Following a dialogue that took place between the European Parliament 
and civil society organizations (and in particular with farmers’ organizations) in October 2008, a 
third objective was added (beyond boosting production and the provision of safety nets) i.e. 
supporting the sustainability of the interventions and their impact on the governance of 
agricultural sector. The program was not universal: to reinforce its impact, it gave priority to a 
delimited group of 50 countries, 30 of which in Africa (European Commission, 2009).  
 
The EUFF was designed to be a mechanism to rapidly scale-up existing programs with trusted 
implementing partners. The original proposal of the Commission limited funding to International 
Organizations only, namely FAO, World Bank, IFAD and WFP.  The rationale was that this 
would greatly facilitate both implementation and monitoring. Yet, the Parliament requested that a 
larger number of potential beneficiaries be considered and, as a result, the EUFF earmarked 
about one-fifth of outlays to non-state actors. A direct implication of this was that the type of 
expenses to be considered under the EUFF was broadened to include tools such as budget 
support, direct funding of projects and programmes, and a call for proposals.  
 
Following the adoption of Regulation (EC) No 1337/2008 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council establishing a facility for rapid response to soaring food prices in developing countries, a 
first set of projects was adopted in March 2009 for a total value of €313.9 million, covering 23 
developing countries, 14 of them in Africa. In April 2009, a second set of projects was adopted 
for a total of €393.8 million, including a €200 million call for proposals open to non-state actors, 
the private sector and aid agencies of EU Member States. In December 2009, a third set of 
projects was adopted for a total value of €129.7 million, including budget support measures. By 
the end of 2009, €456 million – nearly half the Food Facility budget – had already been paid out. 
In April 2010, a last set of projects was adopted for a total value of €145.3 million, including 
regional projects and budget support. All contracts were completed by 31 December 2011. As of 
30 April 2010, €627 million (64%) had been channelled through international and regional 
organizations, €218 million (22%) through the call for proposals, and €136,5 million (14%) 
through budget support (European Commission, 2010). 
 
The EUFF is widely seen as a success (see Roosebreok et al., 2012; FAO 2014). On 17 June 
2013, the European Union received the first ever Jacques Diouf award from the FAO, in 
recognition of its pioneering work on the EU Food Facility. José Manuel Barroso, President of 
the European Commission, accepted the award on behalf of the EU. In a press release launched 
on the occasion, the European Commission claimed to have provided indirect support to 93 
million people, led to the vaccination of over 44.6 million livestock, and helped to train 1.5 
million people in agricultural production, while also boosting sustainable agricultural production 
from small-scale farmers, reducing post-harvest losses and facilitating access to markets. 
Beneficiaries apparently saw a 50% increase in agricultural production and a rise in the 
household annual income of on average €290iv.  
  
A recent external evaluation of the EUFF (Roosebroek et al., 2012) for the EuropeAid 
Cooperation Office presents the EUFF as an innovative and rapid response by the EU to the GFC 
(the design and roll-out of the EUFF took less than 10 months), which reflects the prioritization 
of agriculture and food security in the EU aid system. The evaluation points out that the EUFF – 
which supported 232 projects in 49 countries – was largely successful in the majority of 
interventions to promote supply-side responses and increase smallholder productivity: “Project 
reports indicate that production capacity (at local level) and sector governance were increased 
through targeted actions in 50% of the projects. Strengthened (or new) farmers organisations are 
better able to manage the use of shared facilities, gain access to markets and claim their rights 
with local authorities.” (Roosebroek et. al.. 2012: 60).  
 
According to Oxfam, which implemented several EUFF funded programs in Nepal, Pakistan, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Tanzania and Mali, the programs demonstrate the enormous potential among 
smallholder farmers, provided that “farmers themselves are leaders of the process”. In an 2012 
evaluation report, the NGO confirms the overall assessment that the EUFF was a success, while 
recognizing that building multi-faceted programmes, involving numerous organizations across a 
whole spectrum of society, proved to be a challenge in many cases, which could be overcome 
only where Oxfam had a strong, long-term presence and had strategic partnerships with local 
bodies (Oxfam GB, 2012).  
 
The FAO, which was the EUFF largest implementation partner (with 36,46% of total EUFF 
resources as of 30 April 2010), also recognizes that a number of improvements would be 
required to ensure that the programs have a sustainable impact. In its 2011 evaluation report, the 
FAO mentions the importance of adopting a systems-based approach, and of expanding the focus 
of programmes beyond inputs, to include methods of food production (through farmer field 
schools for example). More attention should be paid to improving food utilization, in particular 
by women. The report also insists on reinforcing ties with local and national stakeholders, and of 
institutionalizing the programs. Finally, it recognizes the importance of putting in place 
supportive agricultural, trade, financial and aid policies (FAO, 2011).  
 
More critical, a civil society network with strong connections to African peasant movements has 
criticized the EUFF for its short-term focus (perceived as inappropriate because strengthening 
productive capacities often requires medium-term support), for being too rigid with time limits 
(for example programmes in West-Africa finishing mid-2011 when planting season is at its 
peak), and for failing to address price volatility and the structural causes of hunger. The network 
also regrets the lack of an incentive for the involvement of smallholder/family farmers’ 
organizations, and for ensuring a multi-stakeholder assessment of projects (although there were 
some exceptions) (CSO Monitoring, 2009-2010).  
 
The EUFF 2012 final external evaluation report acknowledges that many of the achievements 
remain fragile, and that the 2-year time span of many of the medium-term projects was too short 
to guarantee lasting results (Roosebroek et al., 2012). To be able to consolidate on the progresses 
made, it is crucial to continue to support the beneficiaries. Several recommendations have been 
made to institutionalize the EUFF programme into a “standby fund ” (Roosebroek et al. 2012), 
mainstream key program elements into the EU’s general aid programme, and to “maintain the 
momentum of the EUFF” (FAO, 2011: 24) by having the EU commit to long-term funding of the 
  
EUFF or designing a new yet similar programme.  
 
Following the GFC, the EU endorsed a Common policy framework to assist developing countries 
in addressing food security challenges, which explicitly puts food security and sustainable 
agriculture at the top of EU development priorities, and targets smallholder farmers and 
vulnerable communities as societal groups that yield the best returns in terms of poverty 
reduction and agricultural growth: “this new EU framework therefore concentrates on enhancing 
incomes of smallholder farmers and the resilience of vulnerable communities, supporting the 
resolve of countries that prioritise agriculture and food security in their development efforts” 
(European Commission, 2010). The policy framework has been well received for it attempts to 
tackle food insecurity in a comprehensive manner, grounded in the right to food framework and 
in country-owned and country-specific food security strategies. It also insists on the role of the 
Committee of World Food Security (CFS) as the pivotal institution, which should coordinate 
global food security initiatives. For these reasons, it was strongly endorsed by the European 
NGO Platform CONCORDv. 
 
In May 2013, European Development Ministers at the Foreign Affairs Council adopted a long 
awaited EU Food and Nutrition Security Implementation Plan, entitled ‘Boosting food and 
nutrition security through EU action: implementing our commitments’. The Implementation Plan 
(IP), which is to be operationalized in the period of 2014-2020, is part of the EU’s long-term 
policy response to the GFC. It seeks to integrate the 2010 food security framework with the 
various other frameworks developed in the aftermath of the GFC, on resilience 
(COM(2012)586), social protection (COM(2012)446) and nutrition (COM(2013)141). The IP is 
centered around six policy priorities: smallholder farming, effective governance, regional 
approaches, social protection mechanisms, nutrition interventions and resilience building. Policy 
priority 1 is to “improve smallholder resilience and rural livelihoods” (European Commission, 
2013), which confirms that the GFC smallholder narrative has had a major impact on EU policy-
making.  
 
The Global Agricultural and Food Security Program (GAFSP) 
 
In late 2009 the Group of Twenty (G20) committed 22 billion US$ for agriculture and selected 
the Bank to design and coordinate a new multilateral trust fund to scale-up long-term and 
structural agricultural and food security assistancevi. This included support for a new fund, the 
Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP). The program’s central objective was to 
increase public and private sector investment in the agriculture and rural sectors.  It set out five 
priority areas for funding:  raising agricultural productivity; linking farmers to markets and value 
addition; reducing risk and vulnerability (especially that stemming from increased exposure to 
markets); facilitating non-farm rural livelihoods, and; increased public and private capacity.   
 
The GAFSP explicitly recognized that smallholder farmers compose the bulk of the rural poor 
and food insecure and require specific programmatic focus.  Yet upon closer inspection, most of 
the interventions aimed at smallholders mimic the recommendations of the WDR in that they 
prioritize the development of domestic market institutions in order to initiate the modernization 
of agriculture (WB, 2009).  Decisions related to the disbursement of funds under the GAFSP are 
taken by the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Bank’s private sector arm, with limited 
  
input from the UN.  The criteria include national comprehensive agriculture and food security 
strategies and investment plans, a favourable ‘investment climate’, and commitment to 
increasing public sector spending on agriculture.  Funds are distributed to states and to regional 
organizations, development banks and UN agencies on a project-by-project basis.  The GAFSP 
program is not universal as only countries that are members of the Bank’s International 
Development Association (IDA) are eligible to receive financing (WB, 2009: 26). The GAFSP 
operates in a similar fashion to the EUFF. Funding is provided on a call for proposals basis. 
Unlike the EUFF, there is no pre-selected countries and private firms and CSOs are eligible to 
apply. It is similar in financial size to the EUFF with a collective commitment well over $US 1 
billion. 
 
One of the program’s novel and controversial features is a separate private-sector funding 
window. This window provides loans, credit guarantees and equity to firms and financial 
institutions related to ‘investment in agriculture’, which includes not just input and service 
providers, but also infrastructure projects and all categories of agribusiness. Eligible firms can be 
of national or foreign origin, as long as they meet the requirement of ‘doing business’ in an 
eligible country, are profitable, and can service the loans (WB, 2009: 31).  The private-sector 
window is solely administered by the IFC.  There is no reference to the relative size of, or cap 
on, the private sector funding window.  
 
Initially it was unclear whether the GAFSP would get off the ground. In 2009, G8 members and 
other donors (e.g., Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation) pledged $US 925 million to the GAFSP. 
In 2010, only $US 367 million of pledges were delivered and a total of $224 million was 
earmarked for projects in Bangladesh, Haiti, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Togo (GAFSP 2010). 
The picture looked marginally different in 2011 with donors delivering a total of $US 562 
million of their pledges, about half of the 2009 commitments (GAFSP 2012). The picture was 
very different by the end of 2012 with donors’ contributions reaching $US 1.35 billion (this is 
broken down by donor and window in Table 1). The sharp growth in contributions is in response 
to a “donations drive” by the US at the 2012 G8 summit where it announced that it would match 
$1 to the GAFSP for every $2 contributed by other donors (GAFSP, 2013). 
 
At present the GAFSP has allocated $658 million from the public window to 18 countries, 
however, only $51 million has translated into projects on the ground to date (GAFSP, 2013). 
Several reasons have been put forward for this, among which the delay in donor contributions, 
the lengthy process between announcing available funding, the call for proposals, approval of 
projects and implementation on the ground, and so on. Whereas there is over $US 300 available 
from the private sector window only $US 3.3 million has been distributed to this day. To date 
only 3 projects have been approved with $25 million earmarked. The private sector window was 
most strongly supported by the US, Canada and the Netherlands to promote public-private 
partnerships (see Table 1). Yet the trend seems to suggest that firms are not actively seeking 





Table 1: Donor Contributions as of December 31, 2012 (USD million equivalents) 
  
 
Source: GAFSP (2013) 
 
 
According to internal reports, 64% of the allocated funding is directed at increasing smallholder 
productivity. Some highlights include (GAFSP 2013, p. 19): supporting 361,085 farmers in 
adopting improved technologies in Bangladesh, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Haiti, Nepal and Togo; 
improving irrigation and drainage services on 140,812 ha of farmland in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, 
Liberia, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Tajikistan; supporting 60,442 farmers in forming or 
joining associations including producer associations, cooperatives, water users’ associations, and 
so forth, of which approximately 30 percent are expected to be women in Ethiopia and Togo; and 
constructing 104 rural markets or market centers in Ethiopia, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.  
 
The Many Shortcomings of Investment Programs 
 
A first cut analysis of these programs reveals several shortcomings if these programs are to truly 
address rural food insecurity.  First, we note that the programs lack a clear definition of food 
security in their objectives nor are potential beneficiaries identified or prioritized in a systematic 
way. Second, the programs do not distinguish between investment in agricultural productivity 
and investment in food security. For the most part, the latter is treated as derivative of the former. 
  
One potential concern is that without a clear food security objective to anchor programming, 
funding will not necessarily flow to programs that may have the most direct food security 
benefits. 
     
Third, the eligibility criteria for funding under the EUFF and GAFSP also appear to be 
disassociated from food security objectives. The frameworks for these programs do not give 
specific reference to prevalence of hunger and malnutrition in target countries.  Nor are relevant 
food insecurity metrics and benchmarks for reducing levels of food insecurity established.  The 
criteria are generally vague and broad, but in themselves suggest a very low threshold for the 
food security components of national food security plans.  By comparison, these programs place 
greater emphasis of evidence of national and regional agricultural development strategies, which 
do not always necessarily include clearly articulated food security objectives and targets. The 
EUFF, for example, listed the following criteria for identifying priority countries and allocating 
resources: poverty levels and real needs of populations, food price developments and potential 
social and economic impact, reliance on food imports, social vulnerability and political stability, 
macroeconomic effects of food price developments, capacity of country to respond and 
implement appropriate response measures, agricultural production capacity, and resilience to 
external shocks (European Parliament and Council, 2008). What presided in the choice of the 50 
target countries was ultimately whether they had been hit by food prices spikes or had advanced 
food security measures in place that were jeopardised by the GFC (Roosebroek et al., 2012).  
 
Fourth, the majority bulk of the agriculture investment programs are targeted to least developed 
African countries.  Sub-Saharan Africa is widely recognized as one of the world’s most food 
insecure regions.  Yet it strikes us that the bulk of the post-GFC response is so geographically 
concentrated.  The FAO 2009 report on world food insecurity clearly illustrates that the vast 
majority of hungry people, not to mention small-scale farmers, reside in Asia (FAO, 2009a). This 
tends to indicate that the focus of the response was on programs that were both highly visible and 
easy to implement (Christiaensen, 2009), both technically and geographically.  
 
Fifth, neither the EUFF nor the GAFSP has a particularly long-time horizon. The EUFF, which 
was designed to bridge the gap between humanitarian aid and long-term assistance, committed 
funds for a three-year period (2008-2011), with no built-in mechanism for replenishing these 
funds at the end of the operating cycle. The GAFSP has taken several years to take off and its 
projects are short-term interventions. At the time of their elaboration, there was no articulation of 
any real long-term plan or how such investment is to be maintained post-2013. A direct 
implication of this was that it created a strong incentive for states and implementing agencies to 
repeat tried and true programs based on heavy industrial inputs and processes instead of devising 
sustainable long-term approaches. For example, the EUFF has initiated the provision of hybrid 
seeds and fertilizer packages in Africa countries deemed to have underutilized agricultural 
potential. Though such efforts may increase yields temporarily, we are concerned that they may 
undermine the transition to sustainable agricultural models over the long-term.      
 
Sixth, the GASFP’s private-sector window has prompted NGOs and producer groups in 
developing countries to challenge the necessity for such a mechanism.  The international NGO 
Action Aid sent a letter to the Bank noting the private-sector window is likely to benefit medium- 
and large-scale private actors in agriculture who already have access to commercial lending and 
  
would do little to surmount the challenges most marginal producers have to accessing credit and 
agricultural services (Action Aid, 2009).  As the private-sector window is open to any firm and 
financial institution with operations in eligible countries, a legitimate question is how to ensure 
funding will genuinely go towards improving services for small producers and encourage the 
growth of small domestic firms and cooperatives, rather than have the unintended effect of 
increasing market concentration of existing domestic and transnational agribusiness and 
enterprises.  
 
Policy and Political Implications: Initial Observations  
 
At the broadest level, the robust political and financial support for these programs from donors, 
recipients, and international organizations has major implications for the future of agriculture 
policy and the political struggles taking place around the future of the world food system. In 
response to the economic incentives created by these programs, developing countries and their 
partners find themselves under significant pressure to implement and maintain programs 
consistent with the objectives of the EUFF and GAFSP, namely rapidly increasing yields and 
establishing market institutions to encourage entrepreneurship in the agricultural sector.  These 
incentives are likely to weaken support for, and reinforce biases against, agricultural programs 
emphasizing sustainable/low-input small-scale production, agro-ecology and alternative forms of 
marketing systems.  In fact, a careful reading of the GAFSP illustrates that concerns over 
environmental sustainability, the preservation of biodiversity or climate change fall well below 
those of increasing yields and encouraging investment. 
 
Improving the economic opportunities for smallholder farmers is at the core of these programs. 
This type of discourse is invoked because it supports the concept that small farmers hold 
‘untapped potential’ for quickly and efficiently raising yields and boosting production. 
Considering the low penetration of modern farming techniques and technology among small-
scale farmers, it holds that the potential marginal value of each dollar invested is theoretically 
high.  Yet, our central argument is that only a small fraction of smallholders have the assets and 
profile required to take advantage of such programs.  By definition, the way in which investment 
programs are designed excludes a priori many of those most vulnerable to food prices hikes we 
have witnessed: the landless, agricultural workers, pastoralists, indigenous or tribal peoples. 
Akram-Lodhi (2008) argues that at the core of the new agriculture policy focus, epitomized by 
the WDR 2008, is the vision of a ‘commercially-oriented’ and ‘entrepreneurial’ class of 
smallholder farming as the idealized target of their programs.  This subset of smallholder farmers 
is best positioned to take advantage of access to new resources.   Yet in practice, this leads to 
‘inefficient’ smallholder farmers being displaced by more savvy and efficient entrepreneurial 
farmers, potentially leading to intensified economical and social stratification (Akram-Lodhi, 
2008), and increased competition over productive resources (land, water, etc.).  The losing 
farmers in this equation are often unable to find alternative sources of employment and 
livelihoods. In our view, multilateral institutions and donors are dangerously optimistic about the 
opportunities for non-farm income ‘exit-strategies’ and it is highly problematic that investment 
programs fail to address how inevitable losers would be compensated in the process. 
 
In addition, these programs fall short of tapping the potential contribution of smallholder farmers 
to improving food security in a sustainable manner.  The International Assessment of 
  
Agricultural Knowledge, Science, and Technology for Development (IAASTD) noted that 
expanding the use of traditional smallholders techniques such as water and nutrient conservation, 
pest management, and development of local plant varieties and other agro-ecological practices 
could yield significant sustainable food security benefitsvii. However, this holistic view of 
smallholder farming has not been mainstreamed at the multilateral level and sustainability 
criteria in the EUFF and GAFSP are very vague and a low priority. The EU Parliament requested 
that the Commission take the IAASTD recommendations into account when drafting its Food 
Facility, but most of the EU funded production-boosting programs relied on the old “improved 
seeds and fertilizers” recipe.  
 
This new global development policy paradigm echoes the era of structural adjustment programs 
(SAPs) with radical critics seeing this as another neoliberal attack by the Northern-led global aid 
architecture. These are certainly fair criticisms. However, we wish to point out some differences. 
The first is that unlike SAPs, the current paradigm is not simply about rolling back the state for 
the magic of the market to take its place. Rather, the new paradigm sees market failure as the 
context; there is a necessary role for public sector (working alongside the private sector) to create 
institutions and incentives to overcome market failures. The second is that there is broad 
consensus towards increasing state involvement and spending in the agriculture sector, including 
multilateral assistance directed at supporting the creation of state capacity (as well as private 
sector capacity). This is unlike the SAPs era where the first target of state restructuring was the 
agricultural sector. However, we observe the underlying logic of a market-driven solution is at 
the core of past and present global development thinking. 
 
The Transnational Peasant Response 
 
The transnational agrarian movement La Via Campesina, and other rural social movements, have 
strongly opposed the multilateral post-crisis agenda that has sought to incorporate individual 
smallholders into high-value production serving global supply chains, thereby disconnecting 
peasants - as a collective - from their social, cultural and natural environment (Vía Campesina,  
2008; Borras, 2010). Alerting the international community to the dangers of the so-called new 
green revolution and the limitations of the seeds and fertilizer approach, the movement has 
engaged in a counter-framing attempt to put peasants and peasant farming at the forefront of the 
food crisis response. La Vía Campesina has also seized the global food crisis as an opportunity to 
promote and defend an alternative grounded in the ‘peasant way’: “Peasants can feed the planet” 
and “peasants can cool the planet” are slogans indicative of the role that organised peasants are 
demanding to play in today’s globalized world. While pointing at industrial agriculture as a 
major contributor to climate change, La Via Campesina activists have argued that agro-ecology, 
low-input farming and sound peasant practices were the only way out. They have asserted their 
right to be and stay peasants, and emphasized the importance of diversification (not 
specialization), access to resources (not investments in land), autonomy (not incorporation) and 
relocalization (not trade liberalization). They have demanded to be involved in global, national 
and local policy design and policy-making (Claeys, 2012).   
 
Over the last decades, local and national peasant organisations have worked to develop 
alternatives on the ground, linking consumers to producers, exchanging seeds, information, and 
farming practices. This takes time, trust, and carefully built networks. It also requires access to 
  
productive resources, land in particular. The crisis response does the opposite: it ignores vital 
issues such as access to resources – to the contrary accelerating the appropriation of nature 
through “green grabbing” (Fairhead, Leach, et Scoones, 2012)—, and does not build on peasant-
based initiatives. Instead, it brings smallholders top-down cash-intensive solutions that may well 
undermine promising alternatives and endanger the cohesion of peasant networks.  
 
Working with peasants requires involving them in the design and implementation of the policies 
and programmes that are supposed to support them. Yet, peasant organizations were not invited 
to take part in the global summits or coordination mechanisms that were established to elaborate 
the crisis response, and neither the EUFF nor the GAFSP involved such groups significantly at 
the programming stage, although many of the EUFF’s implementation partners, such as the FAO 
and Oxfam, sought to work with farmers’ organizations after particular projects were approved.  
A constructive dialogue with peasant communities would have shown the heterogeneity of 
peasants, from small to medium to large, from the landless to peasants depending upon hiring out 
labour to supplement their income from the land. It would have highlighted their mobility across 
multiple territories, encompassing rural and urban areas. It would have enabled the elaboration of 
a crisis response that truly builds on the diversity and multidimensional character of peasants’ 
livelihood strategies. 
 
The set of food sovereignty policies advanced by peasant groups to address the GFC would have 
been interesting to consider and may have led to alternative designs of the EUFF and GAFSP. 
Such policies included: protection domestic food markets against both dumping (artificially low 
prices) and artificially high prices driven by speculation and volatility in global markets; return 
to improved versions of supply management policies at the national level and improved 
international commodity agreements at a global level; recover the productive capacity of peasant 
and family farm sectors, via floor prices, improved marketing boards, public-sector budgets, and 
genuine agrarian reform; rebuild improved versions of public sector and or farmer owned basic 
food inventories; put in place controls against hoarding, speculating; establish a moratorium on 
biofuels; switch to agroecology to break the link between food and petroleum prices, and to 
conserve and restore the productive capacity of farm lands (Rosset 2009). None of these 




The GFC produced a new global food security policy responses towards increasing investment in 
smallholder agriculture. Multilateral agriculture investment programs have gained wide currency 
among donors, recipient governments and multilateral organizations because these programs 
were matched with significant financial and political resources to ensure their success. A key step 
to building this policy consensus and a demand for such programs was a strategic rearticulating 
of the GFC as a crisis of insufficient agricultural production instead of a broader understanding 
of the complex and multidimensional nature of this particular historical crisis. The obfuscation 
the polyvalent drivers behind the crisis enabled a new discourse of a crisis of production that 
facilitated the reframing of development policy debates towards a narrow perspective about the 
role of small-scale agricultural producers in world agriculture.  
 
An examination of the two flagship programs launched in response to the GFC to promote 
  
investment in smallholder agriculture, the EUFF and GAFSP, demonstrated that these programs 
did not adequately take into account the obstacles poor farmers themselves have identified as 
critical to improving their food security and livelihoods. The shortcomings of new multilateral 
agricultural investment program, such as a lack of anchoring in food security objectives and 
goals, limited geographic focus, short-termism and uncertainty whether programming is 
sufficiently targeted to smallholder farmers rather than larger players in the sector, raises 
significant concerns about the benefits to smallholders (or if such programs reinforce conditions 
and structures that increase stratification in the countryside). On the surface these programs can 
be read as a significant break with decades of mainstream development policy that for the most 
part excluded peasants. Yet our reading is that multilateral investment programs are in fact about 
promoting a new agenda of agricultural modernization; to date these have not tackled the 
structural problems or minimize the price volatility that peasants and other marginal farmers face 
and which precipitated the GFC. Instead, the focus of these programs is to scale-up the quantity 
and quality of smallholder production, enabling public-private partnerships, including facilitating 
new linkages to regional and global markets. The extent to which such externally imposed policy 
paradigms will alter smallholder farming is a question for future research. We suggest that 
analyzing how smallholder farmers challenge the policy assumptions of these development 
projects and their capacity to capture the heterogeneity on the ground is a promising line of 
inquiry (see Eakin et al., 2014).  
 
We observe that despite their shortcoming, investment in smallholder agriculture programs, are 
reflective of a new development policy consensus. Multilateral and bilateral programs have 
become an increasing component of the development assistance portfolio of multilateral and 
bilateral donors. As such, there appears to be a stickiness of these ideas and we suggest that for 
the medium-term agriculture development is likely to focus on restructuring smallholder 
agriculture towards integrations with regional and global markets and value chains. This marks 
an important shift in the tenor and scope of development assistance to agriculture. We further 
observe that the stickiness of these ideas are not restricted to Northern capitals but that these 
ideas have a transnational scope. Many of the policies and projects associated with the EUFF and 
GAFSP overlap with the new develop philanthropy by donors such as the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundations (Thompson, 2012). In addition, new development donors such as China and Brazil 
are similarly engaged in similar projects to investment in smallholder agriculture, particularly in 
Africa. This points towards a new transnational convergence in development thinking and 
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i For the most part, conventional analyses of the global food crises have emphasized longer-term factors such as 
declining investment in agriculture, the shift towards export-oriented versus domestic food production, unfair terms 
of international trade for developing countries, and short-term factors such as the link between energy prices and 
demand for biofuels, financial speculation on commodity markets, export restrictions, and historically low levels of 
reserves stocks in exacerbating price and market volatility (Heady & Fan, 2008; Mittal, 2009; Margulis, 2009). 
ii Institutions range from universities, the state, the G8 to the UN system have all created multi-perspective 
networks; for example, academic initiatives involve multidisciplinary that involve soil scientists to social 
anthropologists, the G8 has developed teams of development, agriculture and finance officials co-developing policy. 
Even the UN system has moved to an inter-agency approach. 
iii It is worth mentioning that there is debate about the reliability of the data. Whether under-productivity may well 
  
                                                                                                                                                             
be the result of “rational” decisions by farmers facing multiple risks is also less clear cut. 
iv Source: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-541_en.htm 
v Source: http://www.concordeurope.org/208-concord-position-on-the-eu-food-security-policy-framework-
implementation-plan 
vi Source: http://www.pittsburghsummit.gov/resources/129662.htm, accessed 28 November 2009. 
vii Source: http://www.agassessment.org/ Accessed 21 December 2009. 
